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Abstract 
There is a substantial empirical literature quantifying the positive relationship between city 
size and productivity.  The paper draws out the implications of this productivity relationship 
for evaluations of urban transport improvements.  A theoretical model is developed and used 
to derive a wider cost-benefit measure that includes productivity effects.  The order of 
magnitude of such effects is illustrated by calculations in a simple computable equilibrium 
model.  It is argued that productivity effects, particularly when combined with distortionary 
taxation, are quantitatively important, substantially increasing the gains that are created by 
urban transport improvements. 
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11. Introduction
There is considerable evidence of the productivity benefits of clustering economic activity
together into dense spatial units.  Indeed, the existence of such agglomeration economies is the
main economic basis for the existence of cities.  Against this benefit are the costs associated
with moving around within cities, and perhaps also costs of getting goods into and out of the
city.  The trade-off between these sources of benefit and cost is one of the main determinants
of city size.  This trade-off suggests that a transport improvement may enable a city to become
larger, and thereby increase the extent to which agglomeration benefits are achieved.  The
objective of this paper is to show how these arguments change the way in which urban
transport improvements should be appraised.  In addition to the effects captured in a standard
cost-benefit analysis, a transport improvement increases productivity for new city workers and
also for existing city workers now reaping the benefits of a larger agglomeration.  These
productivity effects interact with distortions created by income taxation, reinforcing the gains
further.  We argue that these wider benefits of transport improvements, absent from a standard
analysis, may be quantitatively significant. 
The argument is organised as follows.  We start (section 2) with a short review of the
evidence on the productivity effects of urban centres.  Section 3 outlines a model of urban
equilibrium and section 4 derives analytically the effects of a transport improvement in a
simplified version of the model.  Section 5 reports numerical simulations of the effects of a
transport improvement, establishing the quantitative significance of the mechanisms analysed.
2.  The productivity/ city size relationship
The productivity advantage of large cities is illustrated by the example of London.  Table 1
reports data for each of the London NUTS 3 regions relative to the national average.  GDP per
full-time employee is 35% above the national average in Inner London West, and around 7%
above in the poorer regions of Outer London East and North East, and South.  The GDP
figures are not an adequate measure of productivity as they include allocation of non-labour
income across regions.  Concentrating on labour income we see, in column 2, that London’s
advantage in earnings is even greater, with Inner London West being nearly 80% above the
national average.  This measure overstates productivity differences as it fails to control for  the
occupational and skill composition of the labour force.  Column 3 goes some way to
correcting for this by computing an index of earnings, constructed from 3 digit occupational
2groups with occupational composition held constant across all spatial units.  Looking across
these indices, Inner London East and West are around 41% and 34% above the national
average, while the outer regions are up to 20% above.  Econometric work controlling
additionally for skills finds very substantial productivity premia in London relative to the
national average (see Rice and Venables 2004).
Table 1:  Productivity and Earnings in London, 1998-2001, UK = 100.
GDP per
employee
hour worked
Hourly
earnings
Earnings index
(controlling for
occupational
composition)
Inner London West 135.0 178.8 141.2
Inner London East 120.0 147.9 134.0
Outer London E & NE 107.3 107.3 107.6
Outer London S 107.1 116.3 109.5
Outer London W & NW 126.7 129.6 119.7
Source UK Office of National Statistics, New Earnings Survey.  See Rice and Venables
(2004) for further details.
The facts sketched out for London are just one example of a general relationship
between the scale (or density) of economic activity and productivity, the micro-economic
foundations of which come from several sources -- through thick labour markets, input-output
linkages, or knowledge spillovers.  Rosenthal and Strange (2004) review the empirical
literature.  A large number of studies use cross-section data on cities (typically but not
exclusively in the US) to relate productivity to city size.  Findings vary according to the extent
to which researchers are able to control for the quality of inputs – capital stock and the skill of
the labour force – and typically yield the result that doubling city size increases productivity
by an amount in the range 3 - 8%, i.e. an elasticity of productivity with respect to city size of
between 0.04 and 0.11.  For the UK, Rice and Venables (2004) find a corresponding elasticity
of 0.04.  Studies by Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002) relate productivity to the
spatial density of economic activity, using data for the US and for Europe respectively, and
find an elasticity of productivity with respect to density of around 0.06. 
While most studies are done at the aggregate city level, some focus on particular
1  For a survey of transport evaluation see Small (1999).  The arguments in this paper
depend on market failures, not simply the derived market benefits that are captured by
standard techniques (Mohring 1993).
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sectors (eg Nakumura 1985, Henderson 1986, 2003), distinguishing between urbanisation
effects (the effect of city size as a whole) and localisation effects (the effect of the scale of
operation of a particular sector in the city).  Generally, the latter are more pronounced, and
vary across sectors; for example, Henderson finds quite large effects in US high-tech sectors,
and no effects in more traditional sectors.  
While the debate on the magnitude of these effects is far from closed, there is enough
evidence to suggest a positive city size/ productivity relationship.  The relationship suggests
several ways in which a transport improvement might effect productivity.  One is that by
improving links between firms within the city the effective density of the cluster rises.  The
other is that, by relaxing constraints on access to the centre, overall city employment is
increased.  This paper concentrates on the second of these mechanisms, essentially because of
the existence of robust empirical estimates of the elasticity of productivity with respect to city
employment.  We argue that it creates two effects that need to be valued in cost-benefit
analyses of urban transport.  The first is the agglomeration externality, and the second a tax
distortion, arising as the benefits (extra income) and costs (extra commuting) of urban
employment are split by an income tax wedge.  Our analysis shows how to include these
effects in appraisals of transport improvements, and points to the undervaluation of benefits if
they are ignored.1 
3.  Urban equilibrium
How can a situation in which productivity is higher in the city than in the hinterland be
consistent with equilibrium?  The answer given by standard urban economics models (as
developed by Alonso 1964, see Fujita and Thisse 2002 for a recent review) is that the city
imposes its own costs such that, at the margin, individuals are indifferent between city and
non-city locations.  The mechanism is the commuting cost that urban workers incur in
travelling to their jobs in the central business district (CBD).  The city expands up to the point
at which these are high enough that a worker is indifferent between locating at the edge of the
city and commuting to the CBD, or living (and working) in a non-city location.  Although
transport costs secure indifference at the margin, the city as a whole generates an economic
2  This assumes a perfectly elastic supply of labour to the city.  If this does not hold
then wages will be bid up, and the surplus divided between owners of land and labour.
3  For theory models that generate particular forms of this relationship see Fujita and
Thisse (2002), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
4  For the effects of intermediate inputs see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
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surplus from its productivity advantage.  The surplus arises as workers who live closer to the
city centre pay lower commuting costs.  However, this surplus is all captured by rent/ house
prices so that, in equilibrium, the entire surplus accrues to owners of the immobile factor –
land.2
A formal description of this is as follows.  Geographical space is divided into an
arbitrarily large number of units some of which are in the city and others outside.  The units
are indexed by s.  The area of unit s is a(s), and it may be occupied either by x(s) households
or by firms offering y(s) jobs.  These area and density parameters are exogenous.
The productivity (output per worker) of a job at location s depends on the total number
of jobs in the city according to the function q(N(s)), where 
. (1)
R(s,z) is a decreasing function of the distance between locations s and z.  N(s) is therefore the
sum of the all the jobs in the city, y(s), weighted by the function R(s, z) of their distance from
location s.  If q is an increasing function, then productivity in unit s rises the more jobs there
are in the city, and the closer they are to unit s.3
If the wage at location s is w(s), other inputs are ignored,4 and firms earn no abnormal
profits, the commercial rent (per unit area) is ry(s), 
. (2)
The term in square brackets is the surplus per job, and there are y(s)/a(s) jobs per unit area.
An individual living in s and working in z has utility
(3)
5  We assume that the direct utility of consuming housing is the same on all residential
lots, and is not included in this equation.
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The right-hand side is wage income net of tax, commuting costs, and rent.  The tax paid on
income is a function of the wage, t(w(z)); the cost of commuting from s to z is c(s,z);  the
residential rent per unit area is rx(s) and lot size in unit s is a(s)/x(s).5  Free movement of
workers equalises real income across residential units, the mechanism being adjustment of
land rents.  Outside the city a worker has real income given by the constant
 so, by free mobility,
. (4)
This expression can be rearranged to give residential rent
. (5)
Unit s has either commercial or residential use according to which offers the higher return. 
Furthermore, land in the city must yield rent at least as great as land in the alternative ‘outside’
use so, for s in the city, 
. (6)
Finally, the supply of workers in the city equals labour demand, so 
. (7)
A special case of this – on which we will focus – is one in which the spatial structure
of the city is such that all workers who commute travel to a common central unit, (unit 0), so
commuting costs at s are c(s) / c(s, 0).  Notice, from (4), that in this case the wage no longer
depends on the location of the job, z, but instead takes a common value throughout the city,
denoted w.  The residential rent gradient therefore comes directly from commuting costs and
the density of activity as, 
6. (5')
Commercial rents are 
. (2')
The set of spatial units now organises into three areas.  Units for which  are
occupied by firms, and will be referred to as the central business district (CBD).  If s is a
continuous variable (such as distance from the centre), then the edge of this area, denoted sy, is
given by .  Units for which  and  are occupied by urban
workers.  There is a rent gradient in this area, holding workers indifferent between units.  The
city edge is denoted sx implicitly defined by .  Other units are outside the city, with
alternative land use generating rent .
4.  Effects of a transport improvement
A transport improvement is modelled as a reduction in commuting costs, c(s), for some
locations.  In this section we put further structure on the model in order to derive analytical
results about the effects of a transport improvement on real income, before returning to the
more general model for the numerical simulations of section 5.
The further structure of this section involves assuming, first, that the CBD occupies
zero area, so commercial density y(s)/a(s) is infinite.  Second, we assume continuous and
homogenous space, and let s denote the distance from the CBD.  The population resident
within the city at distance s from the centre is .  The parameter 2 measures the way
in which population varies with distance from the centre, capturing both the amount of
residential land at each distance and lot size.  Thus, if the city occupies a one dimensional line
and all residential lots are the same size, then 2 = 0; i.e. there are k workers at each unit
distance from the centre.  Alternatively, if the city is circular and all lot sizes are the same,
then the population at distance s from the centre is proportional to 2Bs, the circumference of
the circle of radius s.  This case corresponds to 2 = 1, k = B.  Parameter 2 is less than unity in
a circular city in which lot size is larger further away from the CBD, and could be negative if
lot size increased faster than the square of distance.
Given this formulation the total population within radius s of the centre is 
7(integrating across the city, see appendix 1).  From now on we normalise k = 1, so a city of
size sx accommodates  workers.  Commuting costs are an increasing function of
distance from the CBD, given by iso-elastic function , 8 > 1.  Edge commuting costs in a
city with population X are therefore .  Workers are completely mobile, so the
saving in commuting costs from being closer to the centre is exactly offset by rent payments,
as in equation (5).  We need expressions for total commuting costs and for rent, and these can
be found by integrating across the city.  Defining the parameter  these
take the following form, derived in appendix 1.
Table 1:   Commuting costs and land rents with urban population X.
General Linear city, constant
lot size, linear
transport costs, 
2 = 0, 8 = 1, ( = 2
Linear city, constant
lot size, quadratic
transport costs 
2 = 0, 8 = 2, ( = 3
edge commuting cost =
rent + commuting cost.
cX cX2
Total commuting costs cX 2 /2 cX 3 (1/3)
Total rent cX 2 /2 cX 3 (2/3) 
See appendix 1 for calculations underlying this table; ( > 1.
Thus, the parameter ( essentially measures the rate at which the city runs into diminishing
returns because of commuting costs.  The larger is ( the more convex is the relationship
between population and total commuting costs, as is the case if transport costs are convex in
distance, or if lot size is increasing as population is added to the edge of the city.
The equilibrium condition defining the edge of the city, , becomes, with
equation (5), the simplifying assumption that , and our specification of
commuting costs
. (8)
Since the CBD occupies no land it is also the case, from the production function, (1) with
equation (2), that
8(9)
(where total employment equals city population X, and R(0, 0) = 1, so N(s) = X).  Edge
commuting costs in a city with X workers are cX ( - 1 (table 1).  Using this and equation (9) in
(8), gives equilibrium city population X implicitly defined by
. (10)
This is the key equilibrium condition, determining city size, X; the condition ensures that
workers are indifferent between living in a city with population X, or living in the hinterland. 
We are now in a position to see how changes in parameters – such as commuting costs
– affect city population, productivity and real income.  Differentiating (10), the effect of a
transport improvement on city population is
. (11)
The term in square brackets is negative (at a stable equilibrium), so dX/dc < 0.  As expected, a
reduction in commuting costs increases city size.  
The real income change associated with the transport improvement and consequent
population increase is measured by the value of any extra output produced minus the change
in the cost of commuting.  (See appendix 2 for the statement of real income and the derivation
of (12)).  This is given by
. (12)
The first two terms are the change in production.  The first comes from increasing productivity
of existing city workers (if qN > 0) and the second from expanding city employment, in which
productivity is higher by amount .  Offsetting this, new city workers have to pay edge
of city commuting costs, , rather than outside commuting costs of .  The final term is
the direct cost saving of the transport improvement (the derivative of total commuting costs in
table 1).  Equilibrium condition (10) relates the productivity gap to commuting costs, and
using this gives, 
9. (13)
The first term is the direct effect of the transport improvement on total commuting costs.
Remaining terms give the value of the change in the number of workers, creating benefit
through two distinct mechanisms.  The first, XqN , is the agglomeration externality, so
increasing urban employment raises the productivity of existing workers if qN > 0.  The second
is a tax distortion, which can be expressed as the difference between wages inside and outside
the city times the marginal tax rate, .  The intuition is that there is a tax wedge
between the extra income earned by moving to the city, and extra commuting costs that are 
paid out of after tax income.  Notice that this tax argument does not apply to leisure travel
(where the choice is between consuming travel or consuming other goods, both generating
utility and both paid for from after tax income) or commercial traffic (where costs and benefits
are internal to a firm, and not separated by a tax wedge).  
Equations (11) and (13) can be combined to give the real income change from the
transport improvement as
(14)
although it is often more informative to look at (11) and (13) separately.  We also note that the
same expression can be derived by evaluating the change in land rents plus government
revenue, rather than the change in output (see appendix 2).
This analysis is illustrated in the four panels of figure 1, the vertical axis of which
measures costs and benefits per worker.  The horizontal axis measures the number of workers
who, for the purpose of these figures, each occupy one unit of land in a linear city with linear
commuting costs, 2 = 0, 0 = 1, ( = 2; the horizontal axis is therefore also distance from the
CBD, point 0.  In each figure the upward sloping rays through the origin are the costs of
commuting to the CBD from each of these locations.  
In figure 1a the wage gap between city workers and outsiders is assumed constant at
, given by the horizontal line.  The size of the city is determined at point X, where the
wage gap is equal to the travel costs of the most distant city worker.  At point X no further
workers want to be employed in the city.  Workers located closer to the CBD face lower
commuting costs but higher rents, as given by the distance between the horizontal line
6  More precisely, this is the extra rent paid by a city dweller, over and above that paid
by an outsider.
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 and the commuting cost curve.6  Clearly there is a rent gradient, with rents falling
from the centre to the edge of the city.
A transport improvement has the effect of shifting the commuting cost schedule
downwards, as illustrated in figure 1b.  In this figure we assume that there is no productivity
effect, so qN = 0 and the wage gap remains constant at , and no taxation, so tN = 0. 
Areas in the figure correspond to terms in equations (12) and (13) as follows:
Area " = Direct cost saving.
Area $ + 0 =  Extra output from new city workers.
Area 0 = Commuting cost of new city workers.
To a first order approximation benefit $ + 0 and cost 0 net out as, absent taxes, the benefits of
moving to the city equal the marginal cost, so the only benefit is the direct cost saving.  For a
non-marginal change there is also the second order gain, $, giving real income change " + $. 
In our framework " + $ is the value of the improvement that would be obtained from a
standard cost-benefit analysis.
Figure 1c adds an endogenous productivity effect to the picture.  Agglomeration
benefits mean that increasing city size increases its productivity, so that instead of a constant
wage gap  there is now the ‘wage gap curve’ illustrating the relationship . 
There is now an induced productivity response which has two consequences.  First, the change
in city size from the transport improvement is larger.  And second, the higher productivity of
existing city workers raises real income by area *.
Area * = XqNdX Induced productivity gain.
The real income gain is now " + $ + *.
Figure 1d completes the illustration, adding a tax wedge.  The productivity gain from
the city is the curve wage gap whereas workers’ decisions are taken on the basis of the post
tax wage gap curve.  Consequently, the wage and output increment produced by marginal city
11
workers now exceeds their commuting costs.  Commuters only receive the net of tax share of
the extra output they produce, but pay the whole of commuting costs.  The difference, area ,,
accrues to government as tax revenue, so,
Area , = . Tax revenue.
Notice also that the appropriate tax rate is that paid on the increment to earnings of new city
workers, so is the marginal rate tN(w), not an average rate.  The real income gain is now " + $
+ * + ,.  Comparing figures 1a and 1c we see that productivity and tax effects generate
additional benefits * + ,, and also increase the size of the increase in employment created by a
given size transport improvement.
5.  A computable equilibrium model
We now move from the linear approximations of equations (11) - (14) to the results of
numerically implementing the more general model of section 3.  In a city with a more complex
geography, what are the effects of a non-marginal change in commuting costs on some, but not
all, of the transport links in the city? 
The economy has 20,000 spatial cells and a transport network defined by four lines
that intersect at a single point.  In equilibrium, this point will form the centre of the CBD to
which workers commute.  The CBD occupies an endogenously determined number of cells
around this intersection, and cells further out are residential, until the (endogenous) city edge
is reached.  We initially assume that commuting costs are linear in distance, all cells are the
same area, and business occupancy (workers per cell) is greater than residential occupancy. 
Production technology takes the form
(15)
where d(s, z) is the distance between two points in the CBD so the term in square brackets is a
measure of the economic mass of the CBD.  The parameter : measures the impact of this mass
on average productivity, so agglomeration effects are present if : > 0.
Figure 2 illustrates the initial equilibrium.  The horizontal axis gives locations on one
of the four transport lines, and the vertical gives land rents.  The CBD occupies cells within sy
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of the centre, and rents in this area are given by ry.  Because of proximity effects in the
production function, rents peak at the centre of the CBD.  Residential rents are given by rx,
declining linearly to the city edge sx, where they equal outside rents . The area of the
residential district is determined by city population, and the area of the CBD determined by
the number of people working there – both endogenous variables.  Equilibrium values to be
calculated are city population and employment, productivity, wages, and commercial and
residential rents. 
Although the model is not calibrated to real data, key parameters have been chosen to
be of realistic orders of magnitude.  Thus:
City/ non-city productivity gap: 20%
Commuting cost share of city income: 7%
Residential rent share of city income: 18%
Commercial rent share of city income: 7%
Residential rent share of non-city income: 15%
Commercial rent share of non-city income: 3%
The key parameter is the elasticity of productivity with respect to city employment, and we
report results with this ranging in value from 0 (a benchmark case) to 0.077.
Effect of a transport improvement
The experiment we undertake is to reduce commuting costs by 20% on one of the four lines in
the city.  Figure 3 illustrates effects.  Residential rent gradients on this line are flattened, as the
relative advantage of cells closer to the CBD is reduced.  The city edge then expands as more
locations can access the CBD sufficiently cheaply.  Increased CBD employment has a positive
productivity effect, and this is transmitted into CBD land rents, giving the upwards shift
illustrated.  The increase also shifts residential rent levels upwards.  While the change in slope
of the residential rent gradient occurs only along the line that experiences the transport
improvement, the upwards shift affects all lines.  Thus, increased CBD productivity causes a
further expansion in city size as the return to commuting along all lines increases.
The magnitude of the real income effects are given table 2.  The first row is a
benchmark case, and the second and third look at tax and productivity effects separately. 
Remaining rows combine tax and productivity effects, looking at successively higher
elasticities of productivity with respect to CBD employment.  In the benchmark case the
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change in commuting costs (the direct cost saving offset by an increase in numbers
commuting) is 0.35% of initial city income and there is a substantial increase in CBD
employment, of nearly 6%.  The overall gain is 0.44% of base city income, exceeding the
direct effect because of the presence of a non-marginal ‘triangle’, like $ in figure 1b.
The presence of 33% marginal tax wedge (row 2) increases the total gain by nearly
three-quarters.  The productivity gap between city and non-city workers is 20%, so increasing
urban employment by 5.8% gives an increase in tax revenue which amounts to 0.308% of
initial city income.  In the third row the elasticity of productivity with respect to CBD
employment is set at 0.045, and tax rates assumed to be zero.  The additional gain then comes
from employment growth raising productivity, and its effect is to make the overall gain more
than twice the size of the change in commuting costs alone.  The remaining three columns
have both the tax wedge (tN = 0.33) and a productivity response, set at increasingly high rates
(qN = 0.022, 0.045, 0.077).  The higher the elasticity of productivity with respect to
employment the greater the increase in city employment and the greater the overall economic
gain.  When the elasticity reaches 0.077 the overall gain amounts to 1.88% of initial city
income, approximately 5 times the value of the change in commuting costs, and 4 times larger
than the base case welfare gain (0.44% of income, column 1).
14
Table 2: Real income gains from transport improvement.  (( = 2).
1:Commuting
cost
reduction
% base
income
2: Urban
Employment
change
%
3:  Value of
productivity
increase
% base
income
4: Increase in
tax revenue
% base
income
5: Full
effect
% base
income
qN = 0, 
tN = 0
0.351 5.91 0 0 0.44
qN = 0, 
tN = 0.33
0.332 5.8 0 0.308 0.738
qN = 0.045 
tN = 0.00
0.347 7.9 0.354 0 0.909
qN = 0.022, 
t’ = 0.33
0.329 6.65 0.145 0.389 0.987
qN = 0.045, 
tN = 0.33
0.327 7.45 0.337 0.481 1.277
qN = 0.077 
tN = 0.33
0.324 9.15 0.709 0.662 1.881
Residential density, commuting cost gradients and the change in city size.
The simulations reported in table 2 were conducted with commuting costs linear in distance,
and residential units spread at constant density along each of the travel lines – essentially like
the linear city case (( = 2) of section 4.  The effect of these assumptions is to give quite large
increases in commuting and in CBD employment following the transport improvement.  This
quantity response is smaller if the parameter ( is larger.  As we discussed in section 4, (
captures several underlying parameters.  Thus, ( is higher if commuting costs are a convex
function of distance, 8 > 1; a proportional reduction in commuting costs then brings a smaller
increase in city size and employment, because city expansion always moves the marginal
resident to a steeper part of the commuting cost schedule.  Alternatively, ( is larger if
residential population density falls off sufficiently sharply with distance from the centre – so
the parameter 2 is negative.  Table 3 reports results where ( = 3, supported by either
commuting costs increasing with the square of distance 8 = 2, or equivalently by population
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density falling off with 2 = -1/2.
This change more than halves the change in city employment, bringing it down to
around 3%.  In the central case in which the tax rate is 0.33 and the elasticity of productivity is
0.045 the overall gain amounts to 0.53% of base income, as compared to 1.28% in table 2. 
However, the change also reduces the value of the direct change in commuting costs – more
commuters are close to the centre so receive relatively little gain from the commuting cost
reduction.  Thus the ratio of the full effect (column 5) with tax and productivity effects present
(tN = 0.33, qN = 0.045) to that with them absent is 0.53/0.214 . 2.5.  The analogous number in
table 2 is 1.277/0.44 . 2.9.  Thus, while dampening the employment effect reduces the overall
gain from the project, the ‘multiplier’ effect due to tax and productivity change remains
comparable, and very large.
Table 3: Real income gains from transport improvement: robustness. (( = 3).
1:Commuting
cost reduction
% base
income
2: Urban
Employment
change
%
3:  Value of
productivity
increase
% base
income
4: Increase
in tax
revenue
% base
income
5: Full
effect
% base
income
qN = 0, 
tN = 0
0.18 2.91 0 0 0.214
qN = 0.0 
tN = 0.33
0.172 2.91 0 0.122 0.324
qN = 0.045, 
tN = 0.00
0.177 3.33 0.148 0 0.395
qN = 0.045 
tN = 0.33
0.17 3.33 0.148 0.172 0.53
6.  Conclusions and qualifications
The results of this paper suggest that there are significant gains from urban transport
improvements, over and above those that would be contained in a standard cost-benefit
appraisal.  Productivity in the city may be increased by additional urban employment; this
externality raises the productivity of existing as well as incoming workers, creating real
income gain.  In addition, the combination of income taxation and an urban/ non-urban
16
productivity differential is a source of gain, even if productivity levels are constant.  Moving
workers to higher productivity jobs raises real income and raises tax revenue; extra
commuting costs are incurred, but the presence of a tax wedge in the equilibrium condition
between the wage gap and the marginal commuting cost means that the increase in output
exceeds the increase in commuting costs.  The calculations undertaken in the paper, using
econometric estimates of the relationship between city size and productivity, suggest that these
effects are large – typically yielding total gains several times larger than those that would be
derived from a standard cost-benefit analysis.
These large effects must however be qualified by several remarks.  The first is that, in
the model, journeys are made only for commuting.  If journeys are also made for other reasons
then this increases the benefits calculated in a standard cost benefit, while holding the other
effects constant.  The multiplier associated with the tax and productivity effects is therefore
correspondingly smaller. 
Second, our modelling assumes that productivity outside the city remains unchanged. 
Thus, while expanding city employment raises productivity, reducing employment outside the
city does not reduce outside productivity.  Obviously, if activities outside the city experience a
reduction in productivity following a decline in employment levels, then the overall
productivity effect would be reduced.  The model would then suggest that transport
investments have additional benefit in cities where the employment productivity relationship
is strongest.  The reality here is likely to be complex.  The mechanisms work not only by
drawing more people into the city as a whole, but also by enabling more of the city’s initial
inhabitants to work in the CBD.  Transport improvements increase the effective density of
activity – in London terms, making docklands closer to the City.  The productivity relationship
varies across sectors, and is generally strongest in those sectors that are clustered in large
cities.  All this means that, as usual, implementation of policy based on these arguments
requires careful identification of where the market failures – tax wedges and agglomeration
externalities – are largest. 
Despite these qualifications, the message of this paper is clear.  The same forces that
cause cities to exist – agglomeration benefits – provide additional effects that should be
included in urban transport appraisal.  Estimating their exact size remains the subject of future
work, but to ignore them is surely to miss one of the benefits of urban transport improvements.
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Appendix 1:
The population in a city of radius s is:
  so  .
The cost of commuting distance z is ; constant commuting costs per unit distance are 8 =
1, and 8 > 1 implies convex commuting costs.  Total commuting costs, C, are:
.
Edge commuting costs are .  At each point rent plus commuting costs equal edge
commuting costs.  Total rent, R, is therefore  minus total commuting costs, i.e. 
.
Appendix 2:
Real income in the economy is given by:
The first expression is output in the economy (in which  is total employment) minus
commuting costs.  The second is the sum of urban land rents (table 1), tax revenue, and the
disposable income that would be earned if all workers, , were in the outside region.  The two
expressions are equal, as can be seen by using equation (10).  Equation (12) comes from
differentiating the first expression.  Equivalently, differentiation of the second gives
Using dX/dc from equation (11) and rearranging gives equation (14) of the text.
Appendix 3:
Simulation: Gauss code available on request from the author.
In the production function, a = 1, b = 0.1, : =0.2, 0.3, 0.4, elasticity of output per worker with
18
respect to CBD employment computed numerically in neighbourhood of initial equilibrium.
Residential density 1/5 of CBD density.  Other parameters as described in text.
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